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THE ARBITRAGE PRICING THEOREM WITH INCOMPLETE
PREFERENCES
DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
Abstract. This paper proves existence of equilibrium and the arbitrage pricing theorem for an
asset exchange economy, where the individual’s preferences may be incomplete or intransitive.
This extends existing results to a more general set of individual preferences. We also prove
the arbitrage pricing theorem for a theory of choice under uncertainty by Bewley [5]. These
preferences model Knightian uncertainty by allowing for the possibility that preferences are
incomplete.
1. Introduction
The original motivation for this paper is some recent work in the literature of ﬁnance theory.
A fundamental problem of the analysis of private economies is resolving the prices of assets
when their returns are uncertain. Recent studies on this topic take the Arrow-Debreu Model as
its starting point. In the present paper, we ﬁrst study existence and optimality of competitive
equilibrium for a wider class of economies originally suggested by Arrow [2], where markets were
possibly incomplete. We shall note that our existence theorem is proved as a by-product. We
then suggest an analysis on one of the leading theories of asset pricing, namely, arbitrage pricing
theorem (APT), which is due to Ross [19]. The main result of our paper extends the APT to a
larger class of preferences. In particular, we allow for possible incompleteness of preferences.
1.1. Arbitrage Pricing. Ross’ APT is based upon three assumptions. The ﬁrst is that the
market does not permit arbitrage opportunities. The second is that the market has a factor
structure. The last assumption is that there is a large number of assets. Therefore, the basic
result of APT is that under these assumptions, idiosyncratic risk can be fully diversiﬁed away
and hence asset prices can be expressed in terms of the prices of a small number of factors.
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After Ross’ seminal paper there have been a number of studies characterizing the notion
of the equilibrium arbitrage pricing theorem (EAPT). With either a ﬁnite or inﬁnite number
of assets, Connor [6] presented a general theory of equilibrium asset pricing unifying several
asset pricing models. Using weak assumptions on induced preferences over assets, Milne [15]
proved an EAPT for a ﬁnite number of assets. This was extended by Kelsey and Milne [10]
to most of the leading non-expected utility theories such as Gateaux diﬀerentiable preferences
(see Machina [12]), rank dependent expected utility (see Quiggin [17]), and Choquet expected
utility (see Schmeidler [20]). They also extended the APT to a larger class of expected utility
preferences, namely, the APT was generalized to allow for state dependent utility which arises
naturally in multi-period problems and allowed diﬀerent investors to have diﬀerent subjective
probabilities.
The present paper extends the APT to a still larger class of preferences. Namely, we allow for
preferences to be incomplete or intransitive. The assumption that preferences are completely
ordered has been questioned by many authors (e.g., Aumann [3] and Suppes [22]). This is
reasonable since when individuals have only partial information or when there are many decision
makers whose preferences may disagree.
1.2. Bewley Preferences. Knightian uncertainty refers to situations in which it is diﬃcult
or impossible to assign subjective probabilities. Knight [11] made a distinction between risk,
where the probabilities are known, and uncertainty, where probabilities are not known. Knight’s
distinction does seem to have some intuitive appeal since, in many circumstances, individuals
make decisions involving uncertainty rather than risk. Experimental evidence suggests that
individuals are repelled by vagueness of probabilities (see Ellsberg [8]).
Some models of Knightian uncertainty relax the independence axiom. However, even with
Knightian uncertainty, this axiom may be motivated by observing that consumption in mutu-
ally exclusive events cannot be complementary. If an individual is faced with a complex and
unfamiliar kind of uncertainty she may well ﬁnd some decisions diﬃcult or impossible. Thus,
there is a case for modelling Knightian uncertainty by relaxing the completeness axiom rather
than the independence axiom.
A model of Knightian uncertainty has been proposed by Bewley [5], which retains the inde-
pendence axiom but relaxes completeness. In his model the decision maker considers a number
of probability distributions to be possible. An option a is only preferred to b if a yields higherARBITRAGE PRICING 3
expected utility with respect to all possible probability distributions. If a yields higher ex-
pected utility for some distributions and lower expected utility for others, then a and b are not
comparable. Bewley preferences satisfy all the Anscombe and Aumann [1] axioms, apart from
completeness. These imply that there exists a closed convex set Π of subjective probabilities
such that
a  b ⇔ Eπ [u(a)] > Eπ [u(b)]
for all π ∈ Π. Bewley preferences model uncertainty by representing beliefs as sets of proba-
bilities and postulating a cautious decision rule. In his work, the uncertainty is captured by
the incompleteness of preferences when probabilities are not well deﬁned and by the structural
assumptions which distinguish the Knightian uncertainty from Savage’s expected utility the-
ory. Thus, the size of Π is a measure of the Knightian uncertainty about events in a set Ω of
ﬁnite states of the world. It can be thought of as measuring the decision maker’s ignorance
(see for instance Rigotti [18]). In this paper we shall prove a version of the EAPT for Bewley
preferences.
1.3. Aim of the Paper. The aim of the paper is to generalize the previous literature in a
number of directions. First of all, we shall not assume that the preferences are complete or
transitive. One motivation for this is that many agents in asset markets are not single investors
but rather corporate bodies. Hence, most investment decisions are collective decisions. If mar-
kets were complete, then all group members would have the same preferences over investments.
If markets are incomplete, then it is not possible to evaluate market values of all feasible invest-
ment decisions from the available price system. As a result, even if the competitive conditions
prevail, generically, investors will disagree over the choice of corporate investment plans (see
Duﬃe and Shafer [7] and Haller [9]). In such cases, a corporate investment decision will be
the outcome of a collective decision process. Social choice theory implies that such a collective
decision process will be incomplete or intransitive, if they are non-dictatorial. We show that
the EAPT obtained here will be robust even without complete or transitive preferences.
Second, we analyze the implications of incomplete or intransitive preferences for an asset
exchange economy. Under weak conditions on the strict preference relation, the existence result
will be extended to economies in which unrestricted short selling is allowed and hence the port-
folio space is not necessarily bounded below (see Milne [14], Page and Wooders [16], and Werner
[23]). In the present paper, existence is not standard since the portfolio space is potentially4 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
unbounded. We shall note that previous proofs allow either incompleteness or unboundedness.
Our proof of existence allows both at the same time. Finally, we present the ﬁrst fundamental
theorem of welfare economics in such a framework.
1.4. Outline of the Paper. In the following section, we derive a numerical representation for
a preference relation without assuming transitivity or completeness. In Section 3, we prove the
existence of a competitive equilibrium for a class of asset exchange economies and show that the
resulting equilibrium allocation is in the constrained core. In Section 4, we derive the EAPT
for the underlying preference relation. In Section 5, we shall extend the earlier result to include
Bewley preferences. Finally, the concluding section discusses some of the implications of these
results.
2. Preferences
The subject matter of this section is the representation of preferences which may be incom-
plete or intransitive. Consider an individual who has preferences among alternatives. These
preferences are described by a strict preference relation . Here we shall demonstrate the
idea that a relation  deﬁned on a set X can be represented by a two-argument functional
φ : X × X → < for which x  y if and only if φ(x,y) > 0 for all x,y ∈ X.
Let there be a ﬁnite number of individuals indexed by h ∈ H = {1,...,H}. The consumption
set of individual h is given by Xh ⊂ <`, where ` denotes a ﬁnite number of commodities. Given
a strict preference relation h deﬁned on Xh × Xh, let Ph(xh) = {y ∈ Xh : y h xh} and
P−1
h (xh) = {y ∈ Xh : xh h y} be the strict upper contour set and strict lower contour set,
respectively. We make the following assumptions on preferences1:
Assumption 1. (i) Continuity. The strict upper and lower contour sets are open subsets of
Xh, ∀xh ∈ Xh; (ii) Irreﬂexivity. xh / ∈ Ph
 
xh















∈ Xh × Xh : y h xh
o
.
1Notice that we dispense with transitivity and strong convexity assumptions. However, a mild convexity assump-
tion is imposed on strict upper contour sets (see Mas-Colell [13]).ARBITRAGE PRICING 5
Furthermore, h has an open graph if Γ(h) is an open subset of Xh × Xh.
Our ﬁrst result is due to Bergstrom et al. [4], Theorem 4, and is stated without proof.
Lemma 1. If the preference relation h is asymmetric, then it has open graph if and only if




> 0 if and only if
xh ∈ Ph (y).
3. The Asset Exchange Economy
In this section, we analyze the properties of competitive equilibrium in a ﬁnite asset exchange
economy under uncertainty. Suppose that economic activity occurs over two time periods,
t = 0,1. Uncertainty is characterized by a set of states of the world, indexed by s ∈ S =
{1,...,S}, and is resolved all in the second period. We shall assume that there is only one
physical commodity. The ﬁrst period commodity space is < and the second period contingent
commodity space is <S making the total commodity space <S+1. In the sequel we shall consider
an exchange economy where second period actions by consumers are restricted to trades in
assets. Therefore, we shall treat assets to be the objects of choice rather than examining the
contingent commodities explicitly.
Each consumer h ∈ H has a consumption set Xh ⊂ <S+1 deﬁned by Xh = {xh ∈ <S+1
+ :
xh ≥ 0}, and an initial endowment eh ∈ <S+1. Let each consumer h be described by a
preference relation h deﬁned over state contingent consumption set Xh. We make the following
assumptions on Xh and eh.
Assumption 2. (i) For every h ∈ H, the feasible set Xh is non-empty, closed, convex, and
bounded below; (ii) For every h ∈ H, the initial endowment is in the interior of the consumption
set, i.e., eh ∈ int(Xh).
3.1. Induced Preferences. The basic preferences over consumption generates induced pref-
erences over asset holdings.
Let there be J assets indexed by j ∈ J = {1,...,J}. Deﬁne the commodity space in the asset
economy to be the space <J+1, that is, J assets and the ﬁrst period commodity. In order to
achieve consumption, consumer h holds assets ah ∈ <J which yields returns
P
j∈J Zjah
j, where6 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN










































In order to derive consumer preferences over assets, deﬁne a correspondence Λ : <J+1 → <S+1







The correspondence Λ is linear and onto the range Q, which is a vector subspace of dimension
(J + 1). Deﬁne Vh = Q∩Xh , where Vh 6= ∅ since {0} ⊂ Q∩Xh . Deﬁne consumer h’s feasible
asset trade set Ah by Λ−1 : Vh → <J+1 such that Ah = Λ−1 (Vh).
Remark 1. We shall assume that the set of returns is linearly dependent with rank J0 < J. In
particular if K is the non-trivial kernel of Z, where dim(K) = J − J0 and for any b ah ∈ K and
e ah ∈ Ah, then
 
b ah + e ah
∈ Ah. Hence Ah contains linear manifold K of portfolios all of which
produce the same returns.
Therefore, induced preferences a
h over assets can be derived from basic preferences by way
of the correspondence Λ−1. In other words, assets are desired solely for their returns so that
preferences over assets are derived preferences.
The intimate connection between basic preferences deﬁned over commodity space and of
derived preferences deﬁned over portfolio space can be summarized in the following result due
to Milne [14], in Lemma 1. His result was given for the weak preference relation. In the present
paper, this involves a trivial modiﬁcation for the strict preference relation and hence we shall
omit the proof.
Lemma 2. Let Xh satisfy Assumption 2, associated preferences satisfy Assumption 1, and for
any xh ∈ Vh, there exists yh ∈ Vh such that yh h xh. Then (i) Ah is closed, convex and 0 ∈ Ah;
(ii) The graph of Ph
 
Zah






(iv) For every ah ∈ Ah, Ph
 
Zah
6= ∅; (v) For every ah ∈ Ah, Zah / ∈ Ph
 
Zah






, where cl(P) stands for the closure of P.ARBITRAGE PRICING 7
3.2. Equilibria in Unbounded Economies. Suppose that the consumer can go arbitrarily
short in asset trading. In the presence of short selling assets, one has to work with asset trade
sets without a prior lower bound. As before, a portfolio of assets will be described by a vector
ah ∈ <J with ah
j indicating the number of the jth asset held by consumer h. We shall assume
that ah
j may be positive or negative. Each consumer h is assumed to have an endowment of
assets ah ∈ <J. For each h ∈ H, let sp(Zj)j∈J be the span of (Zj)j∈J.
When the structure of an asset market is incomplete, the attainable consumption set of each
consumer can be speciﬁed as follows:
b Xh = Xh ∩
n
xh ∈ <S+1
+ : xh − eh ∈ sp(Zj)j∈J
o
,
that is, the allocations are attainable by way of exchange of assets. Asset markets so constructed
may be incomplete in the sense that the available assets do not span Xh. Deﬁne the asset trade














Notice that Ah is assumed to have no lower bound. Let A = ×h∈HAh.
Lemma 3. Let {kr} be a sequence of real numbers in < such that kr ≥ kr+1 and limr→∞ kr = 0.










for r = 1,... , then limr→∞ Ar
h = Ah.
We shall omit the proof of Lemma 3 as it is straightforward.











Za0 ∈ b Xh : Za0 a
h Zah
o
be the consumer h’s “preferred” set. Let P =

q ∈ <J : kqk ≤ 1
	
and Bh (q) =
n
Z0ah ∈ b Xh : q · ah ≤ q · ah
o
be the set of relative prices and
the consumer h’s “budget set” in commodity space for a given price system q ∈ <J, respectively.
Let x∗h = Za∗h.




(i) a∗h ∈ Bh (q∗); (ii) q∗ ∈ P; (iii) Ph
 
x∗h




h∈H ah.8 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
Theorem 1. Assume that Xh satisﬁes Assumption 2, Ah and associated preferences satisfy the
conditions of Lemma 2 and Assumption 3, then the economy E has an equilibrium (q∗,a∗,x∗).







h∈H be an r-bounded economy constructed in the following











where r > 0 is large enough so that ah ∈ int(Ar
h). Given Assumption 1 and the fact that
ah ∈ int(Ar
h), Er has an equilibrium. Since the graph of Pr
h is open in Ar
h × Ar







, where bd stands for the boundary of P, the economy satisﬁes the assumptions
of Theorem 2 in Shafer [21]. This implies that an equilibrium exists for the bounded economy.
We shall now prove the existence of equilibrium for the unbounded economy. Let qr, ar, and
xr denote sequences of the prices, allocation of assets, and allocation of consumption goods
in the r-bounded economy, respectively. Notice ﬁrst that qr is an element of a compact price
simplex, i.e., qr ∈ ∆. Since the total amount of consumption good is ﬁnite, xr is also an element
of a compact set. Consider the limit as r → ∞. We may assume without loss of generality
that xr → x∗ and qr → q∗. Let b ah satisfy the equation Zb ah = x∗h for 1 ≤ h ≤ H. Therefore,
b ah ∈ Z−1x∗h. Let a∗h = b ah for 1 ≤ h ≤ H − 1 and















By construction one has Z
P
b ah = Z
P
ah.
Now suppose, if possible, that there exists b ah ∈ Ph
 
Za∗h
∩ Bh (q∗). Since graph of Ph is
open, there exists ε > 0 such that





Let b ah −ε = e ah. This implies e ah ∈ Ph
 
Za∗h






in turn implies that
qre ah = qrb ah − ε < qrb ah = qrah.ARBITRAGE PRICING 9
Since qre ah = qrb ah − ε, then qre ah < qrb ah < qrah. But this is a contradiction since ar is an





∩ Bh (qr) = ∅. The result
follows.
3.3. Optimality of Competitive Allocations. In general, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto
optimal only if the market structure is essentially complete. If markets are incomplete there is
no reason to expect an equilibrium allocation to be Pareto optimal. However, we can show that
the equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal. This means that it is not possible to achieve a
Pareto improvement by reallocating the existing assets. More generally, we can show that the
equilibrium will be in the constrained core.
Definition 3. A constrained core with respect to the preference relations a is an allocation
 
a∗1,...,a∗H
of one portfolio for each consumer such that there does not exist an allocation
 
a01,...,a0H
and a non-empty subset G ⊂ H for which Za0h ∈ Ph
 
Za∗h









h∈H every competitive equilib-
rium (q∗,a∗,x∗) is in the constrained core.
Proof. Let (q∗,a∗,x∗) be the equilibrium allocations and price system. Suppose that there











∩ Bh (q∗) = ∅, one obtains q∗a0h > q∗ah ∀h ∈ G. Summing
over h ∈ G, one has q∗ P
h∈G a0h > q∗ P
h∈G ah. But this contradicts the fact that
q∗ X
h∈G
ah = q∗ X
h∈G
a0h = q∗ X
h∈G
a∗h
obtained from summing over the budget constraint. This completes the proof.
Hence, an asset allocation is in the constrained core if there does not exist a way to reallocate
assets which make each individual better oﬀ. Note that, in particular, this implies a version of
the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Namely, every competitive equilibrium is
constrained Pareto optimal.
4. Arbitrage Pricing
In this section we shall give a proof of the APT for the underlying economy without complete
or transitive preferences. The intuition behind the APT is that, in equilibrium, the market10 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
rewards only undiversiﬁable risk and that the idiosyncratic risk is not relevant for pricing the
assets. It is common to refer to undiversiﬁable risk as factor risk.
Definition 4. A factor structure on <J is a linear transformation F : <J → M, where M ⊂ <J.
We shall assume that the range of F is all of M, that is, F is onto. Let ker(F) denote the
set of a ∈ <J such that F (a) = 0. The elements of ker(F) will be called idiosyncratic risk.




Similarly, two allocations are factor equivalent if every consumer has factor equivalent portfolios.
Let D ⊂ <J denote the subspace of diversiﬁed portfolios.
Definition 6. Consumer h is said to be a diversiﬁer if whenever F
 
ah
= F (b) with ah ∈ D
and b ∈ <J\D, then ah a
h b.
Deﬁnition 6 says that any diversiﬁed portfolio must be strictly preferred to a factor equivalent
portfolio which is not diversiﬁed.2 In the following, we shall provide some conditions under which
all consumers in a factor economy will be able to diversify away idiosyncratic risk.
Definition 7. An allocation is said to be insured if it consists entirely of diversiﬁed portfolios.
Assumption 4. An asset economy is said to be insurable if F (D) = M and the aggregate
endowment lies in D, i.e., a ∈ D.
Insurability allows a consumer to eliminate idiosyncratic risk by holding a diversiﬁed portfo-
lio. The following proposition asserts that in a competitive equilibrium, all consumers choose
diversiﬁed portfolios.
Proposition 1. In an insurable asset exchange economy in which all consumers are diversiﬁers,
any competitive allocation is diversiﬁed.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Kelsey and Milne [10].
Let φh : Ah×Ah → < be a real valued function deﬁned by φh (a,a0) representing the preference
relation a
h.
Assumption 5 (Diﬀerentiability). ∀a ∈ Ah, φh(·,a) : Ah × Ah → < is diﬀerentiable.
2Less technically, if consumer h is a diversiﬁer then idiosyncratic risk is a “bad” for her.ARBITRAGE PRICING 11
Since preferences are assumed to be incomplete or intransitive they cannot be represented
by a utility function, but by a function of two arguments. Assuming φh is diﬀerentiable is
analogous to assuming that an expected utility maximizer has a diﬀerentiable utility function.
Diﬀerentiability of preferences implies that if a consumer is satiated in idiosyncratic risk with
a diversiﬁed portfolio, then in equilibrium, the price of idiosyncratic risk is zero. This is proved
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Assume that all consumers are diversiﬁers and at least one consumer has
diﬀerentiable preferences. Let q ∈ <J be the price system and a0 ∈ ker(F), then q · a0 = 0.
Proof. Since a∗ is consumer h’s competitive equilibrium allocation and q is competitive equilib-
rium price system, a ∈ P(a∗) ⇒ q · a > q · a∗, that is,
(1) q · a 6 q · a∗ ⇒ φ(a,a∗) 6 0
By local nonsatiation, a∗ ∈ cl(P(a∗)). Hence, φ(a,a∗) > 0 ∀a ∈ P(a∗) and continuity of φ(·,a∗)
imply φ(a∗,a∗) > 0 (Upper semi-continuity of φ(·,a∗) would suﬃce here).
But, since the preference relation  is irreﬂexive then φ(a∗,a∗) ≯ 0.
(2) ∴ φ(a∗,a∗) = 0.
Thus, (1) and (2) implies that a∗ solves
max
a
φ(a,a∗) such that q · a 6 q · a∗.
By Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, since φ(·,a∗) is diﬀerentiable, ∃t > 0 such that
(3) φ1(a∗,a∗) = tq
Suppose a0 ∈ ker(F), so a∗ is factor equivalent to a∗ + λa0 ∀λ. Let f(λ) := φ(a∗ + λa0,a∗).
Therefore f is diﬀerentiable at λ = 0 and
(4) f0(0) = φ1(a∗,a∗) · a0
Since a∗ +λa0 ∈ A\ D, ∀λ 6= 0, and since consumer h is a diversiﬁer, λ = 0 maximizes f(λ), so
f0(0) = 0. Hence, by (3) and (4), tq · a0 = 0.
∴ t > 0 ⇒ q · a0 = 0.12 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
This completes the proof.
Remark 2. Notice that if the preferences of all consumers are not diﬀerentiable, then it may
be the case that q is non-unique and contains non-zero prices. However, it will still be the case
that there is an equilibrium in which the price of idiosyncratic risk is zero.
Theorem 3 (APT). Let q be the competitive equilibrium price system of an insurable asset
exchange economy. Assume that all consumers are diversiﬁers and at least one consumer has
diﬀerentiable preferences, then there exists a linear functional µ : M → < on M such that for
all a ∈ <J,
q · a = µ · F (a).
Proof. Deﬁne µ : M → < by µ(f) = q·a, where a has a factor structure f = F (a). Assume that
F (a) = F (a0), then a − a0 ∈ ker(F) consists only of idiosyncratic risk. Hence, by Proposition
1, we must have q (a − a0) = 0. This implies that q · a = q · a0 and therefore µ : M → < is well
deﬁned. Since µ is a linear function deﬁned on a vector space M with µ(f) ∈ <, then it must
satisfy the following condition:
µ(ηf1 + κf2) = ηµ(f1) + κµ(f2).
Thus, q · a = µ · F (a). This completes the proof.
Theorem 3 implies that the asset prices may be written as a linear combination of the factor
prices.
5. Bewley Preferences
In this section we shall propose a representation for Bewley preferences. It will be assumed
that incompleteness, which is reﬂected by multiplicity of beliefs, applies only to contingent
consumption over events of unknown probabilities. We thus show that our APT also applies to
Bewley preferences.
Bewley preferences are intended to model Knightian uncertainty, that is, uncertainty which
cannot be represented by conventional probabilities. When faced with a decision problem involv-
ing uncertainty, individuals are sometimes unable to assign probabilities to relevant events. In
particular, if a preference ordering does not satisfy completeness, individuals are not necessarily
able to compute a unique expected utility for each payoﬀ.ARBITRAGE PRICING 13
It is often argued that when individuals are faced with uncertainty they have beliefs, which
take the form of ranges or intervals for an event. However, this approach is questionable since
it is no longer the case that the probabilities of a number of mutually exclusive events will
sum to one. This problem can be circumvented by assuming that individuals’ beliefs should be
represented by a convex set of probability distributions. The intuition is that the probabilities
in a given distribution from that convex set will sum to one, while for any given event, the
probabilities assigned to that event will form an interval.
Bewley [5] shows that Knightian uncertainty may give rise to incomplete preferences. In
other words, individuals are modeled as having incomplete preferences, but otherwise obey the
axioms of Anscombe and Aumann [1]. In this case we have a set of subjective probabilities
rather than a single one. According to Bewley, an option a is preferred b if its expected value is
higher with respect to all other probability distributions. The intuition is that if a previously
unavailable alternative arises, an individual will put to use it only if doing so would put her in
an unambiguously preferred position.
Let Ω be a ﬁnite set of states of nature, indexed by s = 1,...,S and Π be a closed convex set of
subjective probability distributions on Ω. Let a = a1,...,aS and b = b1,...,bS be two contingent
consumption vectors. When preferences are incomplete, Bewley [5] showed that there exists a
set Π of probabilities on Ω such that if a  b, if and only if
Eπ [u(a)] > Eπ [u(b)]
∀π ∈ Π, where u(·) is the decision maker’s Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility function.
Bewley [5] argues that the above expression is a possible formulation of Knight’s [11] distinction
between risk and uncertainty. In other words, payoﬀs are risky if Π has only one element and
uncertain otherwise. Since the state set of states of nature is ﬁnite, the above expression can
be reduced to








Assumption 6. The VNM utility function u is strictly increasing, concave and continuous.14 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
Let Z be the space of all functions from the set of all subsets Σ of S to <. Deﬁne {fi : Σ → <}






where j is the idiosyncratic risk.
Assumption 7. j is assumed to be state independent.
Assumption 7 suggests that the idiosyncratic risk is deﬁned only by objective probabilities.
There are two ramiﬁcations of this assertion. First, all individuals will have the same subjective
probabilities for the idiosyncratic risk. This is important because if individuals do not agree on
the probability distribution of the idiosyncratic risk, then they would not agree which portfolio
is to be diversiﬁed. Hence, the requirement that the price of a portfolio consisting of solely
idiosyncratic risk is zero cannot be obtained. Second, each individual’s beliefs over idiosyncratic
risk may be represented by a single subjective probability distribution.







The space D of diversiﬁed portfolios is deﬁned to be the linear span of {fi}i∈I. Throughout, we
shall assume that there is a linear dependency between idiosyncratic risks. By holding a linear
combination of assets an individual can eliminate idiosyncratic risk from his or her portfolio.
Definition 8. Deﬁne the derived utility function Vh on the choice set Ah by









such that Vh (a,b) > 0 iﬀ a  b.
Deﬁnition 8 implies that the decision rule is incomplete. That is, if a gives higher expected
utility with respect to some probability distribution, while at other times b gives higher expected
utility then, a and b will not be comparable.
Proposition 3. An individual with Bewley subjective probabilities will strictly prefer a portfolio
which contains zero idiosyncratic risk to a factor equivalent portfolio which contains non-zero
idiosyncratic risk.ARBITRAGE PRICING 15
Proof. Suppose that a and b are factor equivalent portfolios where a is diversiﬁed and b is not.
Then, by Lemma 3.1 in Kelsey and Milne [10], (b − a) is “mean preserving increase in risk” on
a. Let Za be the return from a portfolio with zero idiosyncratic risk and Zb be the return from
a factor equivalent portfolio with non-zero idiosyncratic risk. Let b p = argminEp [u(Za)]. Then
min
p∈∆
Ep [u(Zb)] ≤ Eb p [u(Zb)] = Eb p [u(Za + (Zb − Za))]
< Eb p [u(Za)] = min
p∈∆
Ep [u(Za)].
Since, by Assumption 6, u(·) is concave and a and b are factor equivalent, (Zb − Za) is a mean
preserving increase in risk on a.3 It follows from the representation of preferences in Deﬁnition
8 that the consumers prefer a portfolio with zero idiosyncratic risk.
Let ej be the portfolio that consists of one share of asset j and nothing else. Then,
d
dλ
V (a + λej, a)
is the partial derivative in the direction of idiosyncratic risk.
Remark 3. We only use the representation in Deﬁnition 8 when diﬀerentiability becomes an
issue, and more fundamental requirement is smoothness of indiﬀerence surfaces (or boundaries of
upper contour sets). The problem with Bewley preferences for EAPT is that boundary of upper
contour sets are non-smooth in general. This raises the possibility of multiple equilibrium prices.
Hence it is possible that the equilibrium price of idiosyncratic risk may not be zero. Consider
the case that there are two states and Za = (3,1), so that portfolio a delivers 3 units of the
consumption good in state 1, and 1 unit in state 2. Because risk aversion may depend on wealth,
it is possible that λ units of some idiosyncratic asset will have a larger utility impact in state 2
than in state 1. Note that
u(Z (a + λej)) − u(Za)
is the zero vector at λ = 0. If ej is a valuable asset, and hence adds (subtracts, resp.) utility
when λ > 0 (λ < 0, resp.), then the utility ranking of the states changes as λ passes through
zero. In particular, state 2 is ranked above state 1 when λ > 0, since utility accumulates
faster in state 2. Conversely, state 1 is ranked above state 2 when λ < 0, since utility decrease
more quickly in state 2. The minimizing probability in Π may therefore diﬀer depending on
3Notice that an expected utility maximizer with concave utility function is a diversiﬁer since the addition of the
idiosyncratic risk is a mean preserving increase in risk and will therefore lower expected utility.16 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
whether λ > 0 or λ < 0. This will cause the one-sided directional derivatives to diﬀer, violating
diﬀerentiability.
In order to obtain Bewley preferences, we have assumed that all idiosyncratic risk is state
independent, that is, objective in Assumption 7. Moreover, in Proposition 3, we have also
assumed that all idiosyncratic risk involves a mean preserving increase in risk. Hence,
u(Z (a + λej)) − u(Za) ≤ 0
for all λ, so that state utility ranking will be independent of λ, even though u(Z (a + λej)) −
u(Za) may diﬀer from the zero vector when λ 6= 0. This suggests the required smoothness and
will certainly provide it in the one-state world.
Since the idiosyncratic risk is state independent, this implies that the idiosyncratic risk does
not lie in the direction of the kink in the preferences. In the following we shall use the diﬀeren-
tiability of u() to show that the directional derivative in the direction to the idiosyncratic risk
exists.
Lemma 4. Let T = {f(x,λ) : λ ∈ Λ} be a family of functions continuous in both arguments
with the following properties
(1) For all λ ∈ Λ, 0 minimizes f(x,λ);
(2) For all λ ∈ Λ, f(,λ) is diﬀerentiable at 0.
Assume Λ is a compact set. Deﬁne ξ(x) = minλ∈Λ f(x,λ). Then, ξ is diﬀerentiable at 0 and
ξ0(0) = 0.
Proof. By compactness, there exists ˆ λ such that ξ(0) = f(0, ˆ λ). Consider h > 0. Then
f(h, ˆ λ) − f(0, ˆ λ)
h
≥






(The second inequality follows from the fact that 0 minimizes f(x,λ)). Since by assumption
lim
h→0





















f(0, ˆ λ) − ξ(−h)
h
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and hence ξ is diﬀerentiable at 0. This completes the proof.
Corollary 1. Suppose that for all a ∈ D, u is diﬀerentiable at Za. Then, Vh has the one-sided
directional derivative at a in the direction of idiosyncratic risk.
We shall note that the assumptions we imposed are suﬃcient to ensure smoothness in the
direction of the idiosyncratic risk, which is all that is needed to prove the APT result. Hence,
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 enable us to prove the APT result for Bewley preferences.
Corollary 2 (APT). Let q be the competitive equilibrium price system for an insurable asset
economy. Assume that all consumers have Bewley preferences and at least one consumer’s










In this paper, we have demonstrated the existence of an equilibrium in an asset exchange
economy when investors preferences do not obey the basic axioms of expected utility. Namely,
the result in this paper is mainly directed at preferences, where beliefs cannot be represented
as a single probability distribution, rather than non-expected utility preferences which are non-
linear in probabilities. Throughout it has been assumed that individual preferences were given
by an irreﬂexive binary relation with open graph that were possibly incomplete or intransitive,
and the asset trade set was non-compact.
Experimental evidence from decision making shows that complex decisions, regarding demand
for and pricing of assets, are made in situations where preference orderings do not conﬁrm
to Savage’s expected utility theory. In such situations, it is important to examine whether18 DAVID KELSEY AND ERKAN YALC ¸IN
equilibrium exists in markets, whether the Pareto optimality holds, and ﬁnally, whether the
APT is still robust. Therefore, our study generalize various results in the existing literature of
economic theory.
Possibly, the most noteworthy aspect of this paper is the part that concerns the APT. It was
shown that the EAPT remains robust when preferences may be incomplete or intransitive, and
when uncertainty cannot be represented by unique subjective probabilities. One of the results
of incompleteness and uncertainty aversion is that uncertainty can make simple plans of actions
be undominated. It appears that simple economic behavior becomes rational when it is seen
from a Knightian point of view. We showed that our model implies diversiﬁcation. We believe
that Knightian behavior can explain many ambiguous economic phenomena. Alternatively,
incompleteness or intransitivity can be motivated by the diﬃculties arising from constructing
an aggregate preference for a group of individuals. Therefore, the extensions analyzed in this
paper have useful implications for the pure theory of ﬁnance.
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